Thinking Critically About Biosecurity {#s0010}
=====================================

•According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, approximately 1.8 million (about 1 in 20) patients contract hospital-associated infections (HAI) each year. Of those, about 99,000 die, making HAI the fourth leading cause of death in the United States. The annual estimate of excess health care costs due to HAI is \$40 USD billion.•As a result, HAI are gaining increasing attention from investigative groups, insurance companies and the news media, and human health care facilities all have programs in place to limit HAI.•HAI, which may represent both a nosocomial problem as well as infections associated with invasive procedures commonly performed in the critically ill/emergency patient, figure prominently in human intensive-care facilities.•As large referral hospitals become more common and medical advances allow us to treat more critical and emergency cases in veterinary medicine, the potential vulnerability of our patient population increases.•Although veterinary hospitals have been slower to adopt rigorous infection control practices than their human counterparts, HAI are undoubtedly going to become increasingly important in veterinary hospitals, and veterinarians must take an active role in developing infection control strategies that protect the hospitalized patient, the personnel who take care of them, and the entire veterinary facility.•Veterinary facilities in the position of providing advanced care to critically ill horses must be particularly aggressive in developing and implementing an integrated infection control program (ICP).•Appropriate ICPs facilitate:•Providing the best patient care•Ensuring a safe working environment for employees, students (in teaching institutions), and clients•Protecting the hospital from financial loss and possible litigation•Today, the mobility of many horses (particularly those involved in athletic activities) and the number of contacts that they make as a result, means their risk of contracting contagious disease--causing agents is probably only exceeded by humans.•Consequently, directly transmitted infections can spread through equine populations with relative ease and rapidity. Active infection control and biosecurity efforts are integral to reducing the risk of infection and controlling the spread of infectious disease.•The information presented here focuses on biosecurity and infection control in the setting of a veterinary hospital; the general principles described are relevant to all equine facilities.

Hospital-Associated Infections (HAI) {#s0015}
====================================

•There are generally two broad groups of infections that are hospital-associated and cause for concern in our equine patients:•Those commonly reported infections associated with the hospitalization and treatment of patients•Systemic infectious diseases, which may be transmitted nosocomially•Either type could also represent a zoonotic risk!•Traditionally, frequently reported HAIs in human hospitals are:•Urinary tract infections•Surgical site infections•Catheter-related infections•Pneumonia•Bloodstream infections•Although there is little information on similar endemic infections that commonly occur at low levels in equine hospitals, there is ample evidence that nosocomial outbreaks of disease are *not* uncommon.•In a recent survey of biosecurity experts at 38 veterinary teaching hospitals located in North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, 31 of 38 (82%) reported the occurrence of at least one nosocomial outbreak in the previous 5 years.•In the same survey, when asked to rank which species was of most concern to them for introducing contagious agents into the hospital environment, more respondents reported that equine patients represented a greater risk than any other species.•***Important:*** Reports of nosocomial outbreaks of infectious disease in equine veterinary hospitals (particularly referral facilities) are abundant in the literature and include:•Salmonellosis, the most common•Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) associated infections•Clostridial enterocolitis•Strangles caused by *Streptococcus equi*•Herpesvirus myeloencephalitis•Equine influenza•Equine viral arteritis•Equine infectious anemia•Possible outbreak of infections caused by *Serratia spp.*•In addition to these reported nosocomial infections, other important pathogens include:○Rotavirus○Coronavirus○Cryptosporidia○Multidrug-resistant enterococci•Temporary suspension of specific services or even hospital closures are *not* infrequent. In the survey mentioned above, 71% of hospitals that had reported a nosocomial outbreak had restricted patient admissions, and 38% closed part or all of the facility.•***Practice Tip:*** Salmonella *is most commonly (77%) cited as the reason for restricting patients\' admissions.*•Medical and economic consequences of HAI include:•Increased length of hospital stay•Increased treatment costs•Possible indemnification and legal costs•Loss of future business•In the case of an outbreak, particularly one leading to hospital closure, the expense associated with the decontamination and remediation efforts often necessary in such circumstances, combined with any accompanying decrease in revenue, can pose a very serious financial burden to the affected facility. Deleterious influence on client confidence can have long-term effects on the business and financial health of any hospital or other facility that has suffered an outbreak of infectious disease.•Definitions for nosocomial infection have been the subject of much debate and a number of different definitions exist in human medicine:•Human intensive care unit (ICU) HAI is defined as an infection that occurs after admission to the facility or within 48 hours following transfer from the ICU.•A general HAI has been defined as one that first appears 3 days after a patient is admitted to a health care facility.•Such definitions are *not* always appropriate for equine patients. For example, there is evidence to indicate that at least one major nosocomial threat *(Salmonella)* could manifest in as little as 12 hours after admission and still be hospital associated, or *not* be apparent until after 3 days of hospitalization and still be community associated.•***Practice Tip:** The best strategy is to have an ICP in place that limits the risk of HAI in the first place. Part of the ICP should include when and how to initiate a more in-depth epidemiologic investigation designed to determine whether particular infections are more likely community associated or nosocomial in origin.*

The Hospitalized Horse {#s0020}
======================

•Hospitalized patients are *not* the same as the general population. In hospital, horses are more likely to shed or acquire an infectious agent than those in the general population because they:•Are more likely to be under stress•May be less able to respond immunologically to infectious agents•Have altered nutrition•Have disturbances to their normal flora•May be receiving antimicrobials•May undergo procedures that are known risk factors for various types of infection•Are concentrated in close proximity with other animals that have similar risk factors•Moreover, the horses in a hospital come from different herds so every patient admission is essentially admixing horses from separate populations, thereby providing an opportunity to introduce infectious organisms to potentially naïve individuals.•Therefore, veterinary facilities that provide care to hospitalized horses are without doubt places where introduction and reintroduction of infectious agents occur because such facilities are where:•Contagious disease-causing organisms reside•A greater proportion of infectious agents are multidrug resistant (MDR) than in the general community•Infectious agents are present in high numbers and able to contact susceptible patients•As with hospitalized humans, nosocomial infections in equine patients are an inherent risk of hospitalization, and it is essential that these potential risks are properly conveyed to clients when their horses are admitted to the hospital. Although the period immediately after admission, during which the patient is initially stabilized and preliminary diagnostics are performed, can be multilayered and communications with the client delayed, a discussion on prognosis should take place as soon as possible. As with any discussion of prognosis, the case clinician should inform the client of the possible favorable and unfavorable outcomes, noting HAI as one of the unfavorable outcomes.

Developing a Biosecurity Program {#s0025}
================================

•A successful biosecurity program addresses areas of:•Hygiene•Patient surveillance•Patient contact•Education of faculty, staff, referring veterinarians, and clients; as well as house officers and students in the case of teaching institutions•Although there is no "one-size-fits-all" program that can be used interchangeably for all veterinary facilities, *everyone* should understand their responsibilities in maintaining high standards of hygiene, with particular emphasis on strict hand hygiene, rigorous routine cleaning and disinfection, and reducing risk whenever possible.•Additionally, it should be recognized that personnel working with hospitalized horses are likely to be exposed to a variety of infectious agents, including those with zoonotic potential, and all ICPs should be designed to limit the risk of human exposure.•The extent to which an individual veterinary facility implements biosecurity practices is contingent on a number of factors:•Size and type of caseload•Facility size and design•Personnel•Economic issues•Level of risk aversion•This chapter provides a general outline of the components of an ICP with details pertaining to specific standard precautions. Excellent resources are available in the literature, online, and in the bibliography to this chapter if more detail is needed.

Biosecurity Personnel {#s0030}
---------------------

•It is best to have a designated Biosecurity Officer with specialized training in epidemiology or infectious disease to oversee the program. The training of the individual and associated staff may vary depending on the size and scope of the hospital; an individual capable of reviewing and manipulating surveillance data and monitoring infection control activities on a *daily* basis, who then reports to a veterinarian responsible for making biosecurity policy may be a reasonable alternative.•It should be the responsibility of the individual(s) tasked with overseeing the program to adjust the focus of surveillance and any associated testing based on developments in the hospital, literature, and knowledge of active outbreaks in the hospital referral area.•Subscription to selected listserves and Internet-based reporting systems such as ProMED mail ([www.promedmail.org](http://www.promedmail.org){#iw0010}) can provide rapid notification of infectious disease outbreaks. An awareness of articles about infectious diseases that are published in the lay literature and directed at horse owners can be very useful in client and staff education.

Identification of Patients at Risk: Patient Surveillance {#s0035}
--------------------------------------------------------

•***Practice Tip:** Patient surveillance is a cornerstone of infection control!*•Patient monitoring can include:•Collection and collation of data with respect to HAI, such as:○Unexplained fevers○Catheter-associated thrombophlebitis○Anesthetic or ventilator-associated pneumonia○Surgical-site infections•Report any methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) or vancomycin-resistant *Enterococcus* infections. In a large equine referral hospital setting, monitoring and evaluation of MDR infections and trends in microbial resistance in isolates obtained from clinical submissions should also be part of the biosecurity effort.•It is essential to ensure a good working relationship among those individuals involved in biosecurity and the diagnostic laboratory.•Use software developed for the management of microbiology laboratory data and the analysis of antimicrobial susceptibility test results to help provide close to real-time trend analysis and enhance the use of laboratory data for the complex question of guiding therapy, assisting with infection control, and characterizing resistance epidemiology.•***Practice Tip:*** *There are many examples of such software, but the World Health Organization\'s WHONET software has a veterinary module and is available for free download at* [www.who.int/drugresistance/whonetsoftware/en](http://www.who.int/drugresistance/whonetsoftware/en){#iw0015} *.*•It can be particularly useful in an emergency setting to have knowledge of the most common organisms from specific clinical sample types and the resistance patterns those organisms typically exhibit, thus guiding rational empirical therapy in advance of culture results.•Surveillance for *Salmonella* shedding by patients and subsequent environmental contamination can be a good indicator of the efficacy of the ICP.•***Practice Tip:*** Salmonella *serves as the primary model for organizing an ICP in a large equine hospital.*•Fecal cultures or a combination of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and culture for detection of *Salmonella* can be used on a patient population to determine the overall incidence of shedding and identify groups of patients that are at high risk for shedding *Salmonella.*•Identification of patients as "high-risk" directs biosecurity and any related testing efforts (both of which can be costly) toward the proper sector of the patient population.•The correlation of shedding with particular clinical signs triggers additional culturing and/or increasingly stringent isolation procedures for the patient once specific thresholds have been reached. For example, typical measures associated with *Salmonella* surveillance include:•Decreased white blood cell count•Increased rectal temperature•Diarrhea•Inappetence•Lethargy•Systems for implementation of additional barrier precautions or movement of patients to isolation facilities are an important part of both patient handling and protecting the hospital environment.•With respect to patient surveillance, horses should be monitored for the duration of their stay if they represent a high-risk patient population. If surveillance relies only on information gathered at admission or during early hospitalization, the risk of the patient to the environment or hospital may be underestimated.•In the case of *Salmonella,* monitoring could be by way of clinical monitoring and/or fecal culture (or PCR if available).•Surveillance data from the University of Pennsylvania\'s George D. Widener Hospital serves to illustrate how the information obtained is used to adjust protocols to optimize the benefit-to-risk-ratio and control costs.•Samples are collected at admission and during hospitalization at the following times:○Twice weekly for high-risk colic, ICU/NICU (neonatal ICU), isolation, and bovine patients○Once weekly for all other patients•The data revealed that among horses:○Of elective and nongastrointestinal emergency patients, 1.2% were positive for *Salmonella*○In equine colic patients and those admitted with either fever and/or diarrhea as their presenting complaint (i.e., essentially all equine gastrointestinal \[GI\] emergency admissions), positive rates were 13.0% and 21.1%, respectively.•The data obtained indicated that surveillance in low- to medium-risk groups could be eliminated; high-risk patients are still subject to active surveillance.•It is useful to perform pulsed-field gel electrophoresis "fingerprinting" on isolates, especially when monitoring an epidemic or endemic problem, to determine:•An index source of infection•Maintenance source of infection•Separate or new sources of infection

Patient Handling {#s0040}
----------------

•Patient handling to optimize patient care and infection control involves:•Patient segregation•Personnel segregation•Proper implementation of barrier precautions in high-risk patient populations•Wherever possible, patients in the hospital should be segregated by risk category. Risk may be represented as either:•Risk to the hospital from the patient•Risk to the patient of hospitalization•Patients in the ICU/NICU are considered at a higher risk for contracting infectious diseases, and may be more susceptible to all types of HAI, so rigorous barrier precautions and personnel segregation are required in these areas.•Patients admitted for colic and without fever should preferably be segregated in one facility/area, while those with diarrhea, colic, and fever or suspected enterocolitis should be admitted directly to isolation. Because these patients both have increased rates for shedding *Salmonella,* having dedicated personnel to take care of these two populations as a group is ideal.•Barrier precautions in these areas could include:○Disposable gowns or coveralls○Gloves○Face masks○Hair covers○Dedicated footwear○Footbaths•Additional footbaths or mats may be placed at areas that function as "choke-points" or have the effect of concentrating foot traffic. Proper maintenance of footbaths and mats is critical to their efficacy and includes:•Monitoring disinfectant levels•Timely changing of disinfectant•Minimizing organic contamination and exposure to the elements such as sunlight and rain•***Practice Tip:*** *Even with proper maintenance, the efficacy of footbaths is questionable. Other considerations with footbaths include:* •The expense and difficulty of maintaining them•The damage to surfaces caused by constant exposure to disinfectant residues from foot traffic•Safety issues where disinfectants on some surfaces can cause a slip hazard•In terms of personal protective equipment (PPE) for personnel working with isolated patients, disposable coveralls offer the best protection. Reusing any type of garment is a contamination risk and gowns *do not* sufficiently protect the lower legs, even when over-boots are worn. A waterproof coverall (e.g., Tyvek[1](#fn0010){ref-type="fn"}) is recommended if there is any risk of getting wet, such as: •Kneeling in a stall to work with a foal•Close-contact restraint of a foal with diarrhea•Working with an adult that has pipe-stream diarrhea•No matter what type of PPE is required, it is important that everyone understands the rationale behind its use and, most importantly, the distinction between *"clean"* vs. *"dirty"* so that PPE is properly applied and removed in the correct area and that all individuals move about the facility in an appropriate manner.•Barrier precautions in low- or medium-risk patient populations may be minimal and should be based on incidence of infectious disease in this population.•If possible, low-risk patients should be housed separately from those at higher risk of developing HAI secondary to hospitalization, and, when practical, personnel segregation should also be implemented.•Ideally, elective cases are housed separately from those patients on antimicrobials for more than 72 hours and non-GI emergencies.•Ready access to hand-washing facilities or alcohol-based hand sanitizers is a must for patients of all risk categories. Hand sanitizers have been shown to work effectively even when hands are slightly dirty and should be readily accessible in all areas including animal housing, examination, and diagnostic spaces. If hands are grossly dirty they must be washed properly with soap and water! Hand washing/sanitizing is necessary even when gloves are worn for patient handling.•The presenting complaint and a good history should guide handling of emergency patients, even in the absence of obvious clinical signs, especially where there is a known or suspected outbreak of a contagious disease.•Tests and clinical monitoring may be something as simple as increased frequency of measuring rectal temperature. For example, with equine herpesvirus, which may spread by aerosol or fomites, it is important to increase clinical monitoring of other horses housed in the same area.•Clinical signs such as diarrhea, retropharyngeal lymph node swelling or abscesses, accompanied by an appropriate or uncertain history in any horse, should mandate isolation.•It is important to know the vaccine status of admitted patients for neurologic emergency admissions in rabies-endemic areas.•***Practice Tip:*** *In terms of infection threat to the hospital, the most difficult patient to handle is the unknown threat or unrecognized case (i.e., the patient that is incubating a contagious disease but has* no *suspect history and* no *clinically apparent disease at presentation).* •***Important:*** There may be no way to identify this horse on admission, but a proactive infection control program including daily updates on patient clinical status and a heightened awareness of infection risks can rapidly identify potential infection problems and limit spread.

Monitoring of the Environment {#s0045}
-----------------------------

•Monitoring the hospital environment is critical for a successful biosecurity program. This includes close monitoring of areas to ensure proper cleaning practices and minimizing clutter that impedes proper cleaning, but does not always imply microbiologic testing of the environment.•The focus of environmental monitoring should be:•High traffic areas•Treatment areas•Facilities that house high-risk patients•***Practice Tip:*** *Overall, in a large equine hospital, environmental monitoring based on culturing for* Salmonella *is an effective way of evaluating an ICP.* Careful analysis of environmental cultures plays an important role in modifying biosecurity practices, including:•Directing disinfection protocols•Determining patient segregation and traffic•Optimizing personnel traffic and utilization•Using *Salmonella* as a general "biosensor" does *not* preclude initiating investigation of other organisms, and part of a proactive biosecurity program should determine trigger points for the initiation (and cessation) of testing for other/additional organisms.•Investigating specific problems is a legitimate use of environmental monitoring, but randomly testing "this and that" is *not* an effective surveillance strategy.•Sites chosen for routine sampling should be those most likely to reflect changes in environmental pathogen load. High traffic "choke-points" where there may be crossover between risk groups are good choices, and it is just as important to consider hand surfaces as well as floors.

Microbiologic and Other Test Techniques {#s0050}
---------------------------------------

•Surveillance tests and strategies should be under constant review. Critical evaluation of the microbiologic techniques used for patient and environmental surveillance must be performed periodically.•***Important:*** If the "hospital\'s clinical presentation" does *not* match culture information, or if the surveillance protocols in place *do not* adequately address changing infection threats, further investigation and/or implementation of new procedures is warranted.•Care should be exercised to ensure that any new tests are properly validated and that information is available on the test\'s characteristics and performance (e.g., sensitivity and specificity) before it is used in any surveillance protocol.

Disinfection Protocols {#s0055}
----------------------

•Disinfection protocols should be frequently reviewed and changed based on evidence gathered through patient and environmental surveillance.•Bacterial resistance is a constant worry, and disinfectant kill-curves directed toward organisms of concern may be periodically warranted.•Consideration should also be given to the effect of the disinfectants on equipment, personnel, and the environment. If prolonged use of a disinfectant damages surfaces, an alternative should be found because loss of surface integrity defeats the goal of maintaining sealed, cleanable surfaces in potentially critical areas.•At a minimum, cleaning and disinfection protocols should include four steps:•Detergent step•Rinsing•Drying•Application of a disinfectant, with further rinsing and drying•In areas of high risk, multiple disinfectant steps may be useful ([Box 53-1](#b0010){ref-type="boxed-text"} ). Check to ensure that the properties of the detergent and disinfectant are compatible. Application of a disinfectant in an area that is water-logged may result in dilution to the point of inefficacy.Box 53-1Protocol for Effective, Broad Application of Cleaning and Disinfection1.Have all material safety data sheets (MSDS) for cleaning and disinfection materials available and follow instructions for proper mixing, disposal, and personal protective equipment (e.g., gloves, eye protection, etc.).2.Remove all visible organic material (e.g., bedding and manure) before cleaning.3.Clean surfaces with an anionic detergent (2 oz per gallon of water). Mechanical disruption (scrubbing) of surfaces is often necessary to remove biofilms and stubborn organic debris, especially in horse housing areas.4.Rinse with clean water.5.Allow to dry or at least ensure that the bulk of surface water is removed. If excess water remains disinfectants may be diluted to the point of inefficacy.6.Apply disinfectant solution and allow the appropriate contact time. A dilute solution of bleach (2% to 4%) with at least 15 minutes contact time is inexpensive but may *not* be the most effective choice. There are many other options available. Alternatives include quaternary ammonium disinfectants (e.g., Roccal D), those containing quaternary ammonium and glutaraldehyde (e.g., Synergize), phenolics (e.g., 1-Stroke Environ), accelerated hydrogen peroxide (e.g., Accel TB), or peroxygen-based disinfectants (e.g., Virkon-S). Dilution rates and recommended contact times vary by product.7.Rinse thoroughly with clean water and allow the treated area to dry as much as possible.8.In known contaminated or high-risk areas, a second application of disinfectant with an accelerated hydrogen peroxide product should be considered as a final decontamination step. Allow at least 10 minutes\' contact time.9.Rinse with clean water.10.Drying is important in achieving maximum effect so allow the area to dry as much as possible before rebedding or reintroducing horses. If postcleaning environmental samples are being collected, the area must be completely dry.•***Practice Tip:*** *Remember a surface* cannot *be properly disinfected if it\'s* not *clean!*•Intensive care units with specialized equipment and environmental control can be particularly challenging to effectively disinfect. Disinfectant wipes, notably glutaraldehyde or accelerated hydrogen peroxide--based wipes, as opposed to those containing quaternary ammonium disinfectant, can be particularly useful in these settings where delicate equipment needs special attention. Diligence with respect to infection control is probably most important in these areas.

Facility Evaluation {#s0060}
-------------------

•All aspects of the hospital must be evaluated with biosecurity in mind.•In a large equine hospital setting, this refers to everything from manure handling to flooring choices to the development of appropriate isolation facilities.•The goal should be to have as many cleanable, nonporous surfaces as possible. Critically evaluate the environment. Noncleanable surfaces in high-risk patient areas provide a threat to the care of all horses, especially the critically ill.•Isolation and other facilities for housing high-risk patients must have the ability to:•Care for the critically ill equine patient•Ventilate a patient•Provide intranasal oxygen•Provide climate control•Make a sling/hoist system available

"Clinical Impression" vs. "Evidence-Based Decision-Making" {#s0065}
==========================================================

•The needs of the hospital as a "patient" are best met by making evidence-based decisions.•Biosecurity efforts are most effectively directed by collection and critical evaluation of *data.*•Efforts and resources can be wasted by making decisions based solely on clinical impression.•The implementation of an effective biosecurity program must be focused on the principles of:•Hygiene•Patient contact•Education and awareness•Surveillance•In the wake of an outbreak, the level of risk aversion is *high.* It is important to appreciate that just as disease-causing organisms evolve and change, evidence-based evolution of biosecurity protocols is inevitable and indeed crucial to ongoing program success.•The data gathered from monitoring and surveillance are used to:•Make evidence-based decisions on the effectiveness of the biosecurity protocols•Define the level of risk that different types of cases represent•Keep pace with infection threats•Optimize the benefit-to-risk ratio of the program•The appearance of increasingly resistant organisms in both community and hospital settings and the mobility of our equine populations increase the risk of disease outbreaks caused by infectious agents and make HAI increasingly difficult to treat. A demonstrably effective ICP improves the quality of the facility by:•Optimizing patient care•Reducing HAI•Protecting personnel and clients from zoonotic agents•Providing educational opportunities•Limiting financial losses and liability•Instilling confidence in staff and clients•***Practice Tip:*** *Written plans, careful data management, attention to detail, good communications, and a persistent message are imperative to success.*
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